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Research abstract 
We develop and apply a new set of empirical tools consistent with the tenets of value-based 
business strategies, leveraging the principle that “no good deal comes undone” and the methods 
of revealed preferences, to empirically estimate drivers of value creation. We demonstrate how 
to use these tools in an analysis of value creation in buyer–supplier relationships in the UK 
corporate legal market. We show that our approach can uncover evidence of subtle mechanisms 
that traditional methods cannot easily distinguish from each other. Furthermore, we show how 
the estimates can be used as parameters of biform games for out-of-sample analyses of strategic 
decisions. With readily available data on relationships between firms, this approach can be 
applied to many other contexts of interest to strategy researchers. 
 
Word count: 125 words. 
 
Keywords: value-based strategy, revealed preferences, cooperative game theory, buyer–supplier 
relationships, client-specific economies of scope 
 
Managerial abstract 
Managers need to understand the drivers of value creation for customers in order to make 
competitive positioning decisions and understand when they can capture value under 
competition. However, estimates of the relative importance of each driver are typically difficult 
to obtain. In this paper, we help remedy this problem by demonstrating a novel method that 
obtains estimates of the contribution of various drivers of value creation from commonly 
available data of buyer–supplier relationships. These estimates can then be used to inform the 
strategy-making process.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The notions of value creation and value capture, as introduced to strategic management by 
Brandenburger and Stuart’s (1996) value-based theory, have become a unifying framework for 
theorizing about firm heterogeneity and competition in competitive strategy research. For 
instance, use of these notions was instrumental in clarifying central theoretical concepts in the 
resource-based view (Hoopes, Madsen, and Walker, 2003; Leiblein, 2011; Lippman and Rumelt, 
2003). By jointly analyzing value creation and value capture, the value-based framework has 
provided a structure for linking firm performance and demand characteristics (Adner and 
Zemsky, 2006; Priem, 2007) and has led to novel insights on how value is captured under 
competition (MacDonald and Ryall, 2004). This framework has been used to study drivers of 
strategic advantages in various contexts such as factor markets (Adegbesan, 2009), product 
markets (Chatain and Zemsky, 2011), and networks (Ryall and Sorenson, 2007). 
 Given the uptick in applied theorizing offered by the value-based framework, the 
development of empirical methods specifically tailored to it could greatly benefit strategy 
researchers and practitioners. Yet a chasm remains between the theoretical advances building on 
Brandenburger and Stuart (1996, 2007) and the empirical work adopting such value-based lens. 
A prominent limitation is the inability of mainstream empirical methods to identify and estimate 
parameters of the underlying formal models. Past empirical studies have worked around this 
problem by relying on proxies of a player’s added value1 (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011; 
Chatain, 2011; Jia, Shi, and Wang, 2012; Obloj and Capron, 2011) and bargaining abilities 
(Bennett, 2013). These studies find patterns consistent with value-based theory but still fall short 
of estimating parameters of the theoretical models that generated the empirical predictions. 
 We argue that to fully exploit the richness of value-based theoretical models, empirical 
estimation can move beyond corroborating implications of the models to estimating the 
parameters of the underlying models. Further, researchers equipped with parameter estimates 
could use the formal models to provide quantitative answers about consequences of strategic 
actions, such as: What are the returns to improving value creation capabilities? What would 
happen if a new player entered the competitive interaction? What change in the competitive 
                                                 
1 In the value-based framework, both added value and bargaining ability matter to value capture. The 
added value of a player is the value that would be lost if the player withdraws from the interaction 
(Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996). Residual bargaining ability (Brandenburger and Stuart, 2007) is a 
player’s ability to capture value when competition leaves a range of value to be negotiated between firms. 
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environment would most benefit or threaten a given firm? To reach this goal, scholars need an 
empirical toolbox that incorporates the assumptions of the value-based theory and provides 
estimates consistent with it. 
By developing such a toolbox, this paper’s aim is to put the empirical development of the 
value-based framework (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996, 2007; MacDonald and Ryall, 2004) on 
a par with its theoretical base. Its main contribution is to propose and demonstrate an estimation 
method derived from the first principles of the value-based framework due to Brandenburger and 
Stuart (1996, 2007) that yields estimates consistent with the assumption of competitive behavior, 
instead of taking existing econometric methods and imperfectly mapping the value-based 
framework onto them. The method was originally developed for cooperative game theory models 
known as matching games (Fox, 2008, 2010), and has been recently applied in the strategic 
management literature to study alliances (Mindruta, 2013; Mindruta, Moeen, and Agarwal, 2016) 
while also finding notable applications in marketing (Yang, Shi, and Goldfarb, 2009) and 
corporate finance (Akkus, Cookson, and Hortaçsu, 2015). We illustrate how it can be further 
developed to estimate value creation in formal models based on biform games and show how 
empirical estimates can be leveraged in a model of value capture. This approach is practicable 
with data that is typically available to strategy researchers, allowing for a wide scope of potential 
applications.  
 In the application we describe here, this approach provides deeper insights on the nature 
of benefits of client-specific scope extensions in a setting where prior studies have suggested 
their importance. Earlier work (Chatain, 2011) speculated that client-specific economies of scope 
were largely due to increased value creation occurring from better coordination across tasks. This 
paper advances upon Chatain (2011) by using data at a finer level of analysis (supplier-buyer-
task nested in supplier-buyer ties), accounting for the endogeneity of the observed matching 
thanks to the improved method, and adding more flexibly to the identification of the effect of 
client-specific scope. The estimates allow for disentangling the relative importance of different 
mechanisms that can explain seemingly similar patterns in the data. We observe that the positive 
correlation between client-specific scope and value capture found by Chatain (2011) is the result 
of the interplay between two opposite forces: the leveraging of costly-to-create relationships, 
which favors wider scope, and a net cost of extending the scope of existing ties, which favors 
narrower scope. We find that the benefits of a client-specific scope extension are due to the high 
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cost of creating a relationship in the first place rather than direct synergies between tasks. Such a 
fine-grained difference in findings and interpretation could only be brought about because of our 
use of a more theoretically consistent method. 
 The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we argue the advantages of tightly 
integrating theory and empirical work for value-based empirical studies. We then use an example 
to explain the principles upon which our proposed method is based. Finally, we apply the method 
to the study of value creation in buyer–supplier relationships and illustrate how several questions 
of interest to strategy scholars can be answered with this approach. 
FUNDAMENTAL COMPETITIVE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE VALUE-BASED 
FRAMEWORK AND THEIR EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 The value-based framework (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996, 2007) is a full-fledged 
theory of value creation and value capture. Traditional econometric methods can test 
implications of the framework but are ill suited to estimate model parameters. To do so requires 
building into the methods some key theoretical assumptions of the value-based framework. 
Shortcomings of traditional empirical analyses for estimating formal model parameters 
 The value-based approach frames the problem of firm performance in terms of value 
creation, occurring by the transformation of costly input into valuable output by agents working 
together in a supply chain, and value capture, which is the outcome of competition among agents 
to appropriate the value created.  How much value a firm can appropriate under given conditions 
is the central question addressed by value-based theory (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996). 
Within this framework, the analysis of value capture requires information on the value creation 
possibilities (i.e., the value produced in all possible exchanges involving subsets of players in the 
supply chain) and assumptions on how competition unfolds among those players.  
 While the theoretical framework was introduced two decades ago, most of the empirical 
work in this area is relatively recent. The burgeoning empirical literature has made headway in 
testing implications of value-based theory. For example, Chatain’s (2011) study of buyer–
supplier relationships shows empirical evidence that a supplier’s value capture varies with its 
added value. Bennett (2011) examines factors associated with a player’s ability to bargain and 
shows that these factors influence transaction prices, and thus, value capture. Grennan (2014) 
empirically estimates bargaining abilities out of a formal model of negotiation between buyers 
and suppliers in the market for medical devices. A number of other papers have used the 
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framework to test relationships between proxies of value creation and dependent variables (e.g., 
profit, survival) that are commonly studied in strategy (e.g., Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011; 
Elfenbein and Zenger, 2014; Obloj and Capron, 2011).  
 To date, however, the empirical literature has given short shrift to the competitive 
foundations of value-based theory. This is because the idea that observed data is the outcome of 
a competitive process involving multiple players—a foundation of the value-based approach—is 
only imperfectly incorporated in traditional regression analyses. More commonly, empirical 
studies integrate proxies of added value (Capron and Obloj, 2011; Chatain, 2011) or exploit 
shocks to bargaining abilities (Bennett, 2013) in attempts to exploit indirect implications of the 
model that can be tested in a traditional fashion. 
 Fundamentally, standard methods are not able to account for the mutual causation that 
runs between all observations of ties between firms because these ties form a game-theoretical 
equilibrium. A given relationship is caused as much by the existence of other relationships that 
are observed as by counterfactual relationships that are not observed, because all these are 
simultaneously bound by the equilibrium outcome of the market. Such strategic interdependence 
is qualitatively different from the statistical dependences that can be conventionally addressed by 
including control variables or modeling correlation among errors terms. 
 For these reasons, the existing techniques remain of limited use in exploring what would 
happen if elements of the strategic interaction under consideration changed. For example, 
researchers may be interested in understanding how changes in agents’ ability to create value 
would reshape the distribution of value among participants in a transaction. While the formal 
model accommodates the interdependencies between all parameters touched by a change, the 
challenge of empirical applications is that traditional, reduced-form, empirical methods require 
these changes to be observed exogenously in the data. This ideal research environment is most 
often not achievable, either because changes do not occur as expected, or because systematic 
field experiments are difficult to run, such as when the unit of analysis is the organization. 
Yet the power of formal modeling lies in its providing researchers with the tools to 
extrapolate observed behavior to predict the impact of “not-yet-observed-changes” (Nevo and 
Whinston, 2010). To be able to perform an out-of-sample analysis in empirical work, researchers 
need to have reliable estimates of the theoretical model itself, rather than of its implications, and 
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replay the estimated model with different data. To address this challenge, it is necessary to use 
estimation procedures that are fully consistent with the assumptions of the model. 
Competition in value-based models and revealed preferences 
 The value-based framework comprises two sets of inputs: assumptions about value 
creation possibilities and assumptions about competition. While the former are usually easy to 
parameterize, as in in traditional regression analyses (see, e.g., how different value creation 
functions are tested and compared in Mindruta, Moeen, and Agarwal [2016]), the latter are still 
virtually unexploited, hampering progress in the empirical analysis of value-based models. 
The assumptions the value-based framework makes about competition are encapsulated 
in the notion of unrestricted bargaining. Unrestricted bargaining captures the notion of free-form 
competitive interaction that takes center stage in the theory of value creation and capture 
presented by Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) and in its biform games extension (Brandenburger 
and Stuart, 2007). What is underappreciated is that unrestricted bargaining has concrete 
empirical implications that can be tapped by empirical researchers. These empirical implications 
provide an opportunity to estimate model parameters from data in a theoretically consistent way, 
allowing researchers to move beyond reduced-form analyses. 
Is important to clarify the meaning of unrestricted bargaining to understand how it maps 
onto empirical implications. While the word “bargaining” may superficially suggest haggling 
over a fixed pie, unrestricted bargaining is a more general notion, synonymous with “active deal 
seeking” by participants in competitive interactions (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996: 14). 
Unrestricted bargaining is a strong form of competition that comprises the search for and 
exploitation of all available value-creating combinations. The essence of unrestricted bargaining 
can be summarized in the phrase “no good deal goes undone” (Stuart, 2016: 11). Agents acting 
in a competitive setting will actively search for the best deals available and in the process settle 
on deals that resist competing offers because they offer superior value to their participants. 
This competitive assumption, already found in a key predecessor to the value-based 
approach (Makowski and Ostroy, 1999), is at the core of the value-based theory (Brandenburger 
and Stuart, 1996) and its implications are still expounded in theoretical work (Gans and Ryall, 
forthcoming; Montez, Ruiz-Aliseda, and Ryall, forthcoming). 
 Empirically, the key is to recognize that combining the knowledge of actual transactions 
in the data with the assumption that “no good deal goes undone” allows for the systematic 
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estimation of the value creation possibilities among buyers and suppliers. The assumption that 
“no good deal goes undone” constrains how much value counterfactual deals could create 
relative to those that are observed. These restrictions, stemming from the principle of 
unrestricted bargaining, can be used as a basis for the estimation of the relative contribution of 
observable factors to value creation thanks to the logic of revealed preferences, which “refer to 
people’s actual choices in real-world situations” (Train, 2007: 174). 
The logic of revealed preferences combines data and restrictions derived from value-
based theory as follows. The principle of unrestricted bargaining (our theoretical engine) asserts 
that if all agents pursued the best deals available to them, the economic exchanges we observe 
should provide more value to the parties involved than alternative deals that could have been 
concluded instead of the observed deals (i.e., counterfactual deals). As a result, to each observed 
set of deals, we can relate various sets of counterfactual deals that create less value according to 
the assumption of unrestricted bargaining. We can then systematically compare these two sets of 
deals (observed and counterfactual) to understand what makes observed deals more valuable.  
EXTENDED EXAMPLE 
 This extended example provides a primer on the construction of counterfactuals, their 
comparison to an actual outcome and how this can be used to deduce the contribution to value 
creation of various drivers. We examine an empirical counterpart to Chatain and Zemsky’s 
(2008) biform game model and show how it can be used in conjunction with data according to 
the logic of revealed preferences. In their paper, these authors study procurement decisions by 
buyers who might prefer to purchase from one supplier rather than from several, as well as the 
product range positioning decisions of suppliers. Here, we consider the following problem: what 
can we deduce about the parameters of the model by assuming the data we observe are the 
outcome of unrestricted bargaining? 
Estimating synergies between practice areas 
 Assume we can observe the decision of a buyer who has two tasks that need to be taken 
care of by one or two suppliers. (For simplicity, we neglect unobservable error terms.) The value 
created when task a is executed by supplier i is denoted 𝑣𝑎𝑖. We further denote by 𝑅 the synergy 
that can be had if the two tasks are given to the same supplier. In keeping with the biform 
formalism, the efforts to maximize value capture by all parties in the second stage of the biform 
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game through unrestricted bargaining lead to the assignment of tasks to suppliers that maximize 
value creation (Brandenburger and Stuart, 2008). 
 If the buyer splits its order between supplier 1 for task A and supplier 2 for task B, the 
value created will be equal to 𝑉 = 𝑣𝐴1 + 𝑣𝐵2. If all the work is allocated to firm 1, the value is 
equal to 𝑉 = 𝑣𝐴1 + 𝑣𝐵1 + 𝑅. Suppose now that the magnitude of R is unknown but that we know 
the value parameters. As is typical in econometric approaches, suppose also that we can observe 
the assignment of suppliers per task that is made by buyers, who themselves know the true value 
of R. As an illustration, Panel 1 of table 1 provides the value created by three suppliers and a 
buyer who has two tasks. 
=== Insert Table 1 about here === 
 Assume that we observe in the data that the buyer is splitting its tasks between firm 1 for 
task A and firm 2 for task B. This implies that the value created is equal to 𝑉Actual = 𝑣𝐴1 + 𝑣𝐵2. 
What information can be extracted from this observation? A lot can be gleaned by contrasting it 
with counterfactual assignments—assignments that are creating less value by virtue of the fact 
that the observed assignment maximizes value. One counterfactual is to give all the work to 
supplier 3. In that case, the counterfactual value created would be 𝑉CF = 𝑣𝐴3 + 𝑣𝐵3 + 𝑅 (the 
subscript “CF” is for counterfactual). 
 By the principle of unrestricted bargaining (“no good deal goes undone”), the value 
created in the observed configuration is by assumption higher than in counterfactuals. Thus: 
𝑉Actual ≥ 𝑉CF, 
𝑣𝐴1 + 𝑣𝐵2 ≥ 𝑣𝐴3 + 𝑣𝐵3 + 𝑅, 
20 ≥ 16 + 𝑅. 
Thus 4 ≥ 𝑅, and we have found an upper bound on R. 
 Now, consider another buyer that is facing a different set of potential suppliers and is 
observed concurrently in the data. Panel 2 of table 1 shows the information available regarding 
the various value creation scenarios. This buyer is seen to have chosen to give all the work to one 
single supplier, here supplier 6, creating 𝑉𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 = 𝑣𝐴6 + 𝑣𝐵6 + 𝑅.  
 An alternative not acted upon includes splitting the order between suppliers 4 and 5 and 
creating 𝑉𝐶𝐹2 = 𝑣𝐴4 + 𝑣𝐵5. By assumption, the following inequality must be true: 
𝑉Actual ≥ 𝑉𝐶𝐹2 
𝑣𝐴6 + 𝑣𝐵6 + 𝑅 ≥ 𝑣𝐴4 + 𝑣𝐵5 
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17 + 𝑅 ≥ 20 
𝑅 ≥ 3 
We have thus obtained a lower bound for the value of the parameter R. Taken together, the 
information from the first and the second example leads us to conclude that the value of R is 
between 3 and 5. 
 These analyses, which compare actual and potential value creation, gave us the ability to 
bracket the possible values that a parameter of interest can take. This process can be generalized 
(as will be shown below, by drawing on Manski [1975] and Fox [2007, 2008, 2010]) to estimate 
multiple parameters at the same time, account for fixed effects, and provide confidence intervals, 
within an approach that gives us a theory-based way to analyze data about value creation in 
buyer–supplier relationships. 
 Notice that the method we propose here relies on the premise that competition among 
firms pushes them to find arrangements that are mutually advantageous and robust to 
counteroffers (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996). The assumption that “no good deal goes 
undone” is fundamental to both extant value-based theory and our estimation method. Moreover, 
comparing actual and potential value creation in this manner has the following main advantages: 
(1) little information is needed about the beliefs of the players, and (2) all that matters for the 
comparison to be relevant for the analysis is that the alternatives (the counterfactuals) be feasible 
for the firms involved (Pakes, 2010). 
Estimating entry cost 
 Following the same approach, it is also possible to say something about the costs of 
creating a relationship. However, it is important to notice that there are limitations to this 
exercise when these costs are sunk. This idea is made clear by the following example: Consider a 
firm that needs a supplier to fill a new need. It can either use a current supplier or another 
supplier. Let 𝐸 be the sunk, one-off, cost of creating a relationship. (This cost should be 
understood in terms of the opportunity cost of creating the relationship relative to the expected 
benefits over the life cycle of the client.) Using the current supplier, the firm can expect to create 
value in the amount of 𝑉Incumbent. However, the firm could also use an external supplier with 
which it has never worked, in which case the firm will expect value to be created in the 
following way, 𝑉 = 𝑣Entrant − 𝐸. 
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 Observing that the entrant is chosen over the incumbent gives us 𝑣Entrant − 𝐸 ≥
𝑣Incumbent and 𝑣Entrant − 𝑣Incumbent ≥ 𝐸. This gives us a lower bound on 𝐸. Notice that as long 
as we consider that 𝐸 is sunk, it is impossible to get a point estimate or an upper bound on 𝐸 
because we can only observe 𝐸 being spent, never being recovered. 
 This is not a weakness of the procedure but rather a consequence of what can be learned 
from the data without making a strong assumption about the distributions of the unobserved 
components of value and heavily relying on this assumption. We will not go this path in this 
paper, as we concentrate on expounding what estimates can be obtained while (1) sticking as 
much as possible to the spirit of value-based theory, and (2) minimizing extraneous assumptions. 
Formation of Counterfactuals  
 Key to our method is a rule for listing relevant counterfactual configurations of buyers–
tasks–suppliers in a systematic, theory-derived way. Based on this rule, we will show how the 
parameters of the game can be estimated by comparing the value created in observed and 
counterfactual configurations. To this end, we exploit the nature of the equilibrium underlying 
the buyer–tasks–supplier(s) relationships observed in the data. 
To derive this rule, we focus on a necessary condition that should be satisfied by every 
assignment of a buyer’s tasks to suppliers, once all players’ first-stage strategic choices to 
collaborate (i.e., who transacts with whom among buyers and suppliers) have been decided in the 
market. When “no good deal goes undone,” the value generated by an observed assignment of a 
buyer’s tasks to suppliers cannot be improved upon by reallocating a task to another supplier 
already serving the buyer. Equivalently stated, the value created by the actual assignment of 
tasks to suppliers should be greater than the value created by any assignment that reallocates one 
task at a time from one supplier to another, while all other task-supplier pairings remain 
unchanged for that buyer. By applying this rule to all buyer–supplier relationships, we create a 
set of inequalities that constitutes the basis for estimation. 
 We illustrate the creation of counterfactuals with a simple example (Figure 1). The top 
panel, titled “Observed configuration for a given buyer,” describes the observed assignment of 
tasks (labeled A, B, and C) to suppliers (labeled 1, 2, and 3) for buyer k. Task A is fulfilled by 
supplier 1. Task B is fulfilled by both supplier 1 and supplier 2, which is an indication of dual 
sourcing, while task C is fulfilled only by supplier 3. 
=== Insert Figure 1 about here === 
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 The middle panel of Figure 1, titled “Creation of counterfactuals most similar to observed 
configuration,” shows six counterfactual assignments, obtained by applying the above-mentioned 
rule to the observed assignment. To build a counterfactual assignment, we take one pair of 
observed task–supplier matching and replace it by a counterfactual matching of the same task 
with one of the suppliers that is not currently supplying that task. This last point is important as it 
takes care of potential issues with dual sourcing. For concreteness, consider the observed pairing 
{task A by supplier 1}. In counterfactual CF1 we replaced supplier 1 with supplier 2 (thus, CF1 
now contains {task A by supplier 2}), while the other task–supplier pairings stayed the same 
(i.e., {task B by supplier 1}, {task B by supplier 2}, {task C by supplier 3}). Compared to the 
observed configuration, supplier 1 has reduced its scope (it now serves only task B), while 
supplier 2 has increased its client-specific scope (it now serves both task A and task B, instead of 
just task B). In counterfactual CF2, for task A, we replaced supplier 1 with supplier 3 and kept 
all other task–supplier pairings constant. This time, supplier 3 increased its client-specific scope, 
at the expense of supplier 1. 
 An interesting situation is the construction of counterfactuals involving task B. Because 
supplier 1 and supplier 2 are both assigned to this task in the observed data, we can only replace 
them, in turn, by supplier 3. As before, task A and task C continue to be assigned to their current 
suppliers, supplier 1 and supplier 3, respectively. Thus, the counterfactual configuration CF3 
contains the following pairings: {task A by supplier 1} (unchanged), {task B by supplier 3} 
(modified in the counterfactual), and {task B by supplier 2} and {task C by supplier 3} (both 
unchanged). Likewise, CF4 is composed of {task A by supplier 1} and {task B by supplier 1} 
(both unchanged), {task B by supplier 3} (modified in the counterfactual), and {task C by 
supplier 3} (unchanged). 
 Following this method, we obtained six counterfactuals. In all these counterfactuals, one 
supplier takes on one additional task and another supplier loses one task compared to the 
observed assignment. Once counterfactuals are formed, they are used to generate the necessary 
conditions about value creation. This is shown in Figure 1’s bottom panel, titled “Pairwise 
comparison of value creation: observed vs. counterfactual.” These conditions assert that the 
value created in the observed configuration is greater than the value created in the counterfactual 
configurations. 
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 The approach we underlined here has several advantages. Inequalities are necessary 
conditions that hold for all observed configurations involving a buyer, its suppliers, and the 
assignment of the buyer’s tasks to actual suppliers. These conditions are consistent with a biform 
game in which the collaboration of buyers and suppliers and the assignment of the buyer’s tasks 
to suppliers emerge as buyers and their suppliers maximize the joint surplus given the 
competitive environment (Chatain and Zemsky, 2007). Note that we only need to assume that the 
observed choices create more value than the simple-to-construct counterfactuals we consider, not 
necessarily any possible counterfactual. 
 Second, the construction of counterfactuals provides relevant information for the 
estimation of the effect of variation in client-specific scope. In the potential, unrealized 
assignment, the actual supplier loses one task, while the newly assigned supplier takes on an 
additional task and thus increases its client-specific scope relative to that actually realized. This 
procedure allows us to estimate the impact of a change in the supplier’s client-specific scope on 
value creation because it focuses on the variation of client-specific scope in the counterfactuals. 
 Third, the counterfactual formation rule controls for the heterogeneity among buyers. All 
exchanges involve reassigning a buyer’s tasks to suppliers who are already serving the buyer. 
Therefore, the interaction terms between buyer attributes (including buyer-task characteristics) 
and supplier attributes have the same effect on value creation in both the actual and 
counterfactual configurations. 
 Fourth, the counterfactual formation rule keeps the demand of the clients constant, as in 
the actual data. Indeed, reassignments keep the make-or-buy and dual-sourcing decisions of the 
buyer unchanged. The counterfactual creation method enables creating variation in the client-
specific scope but does not require asking what would happen if buyers internalized a task or if 
they switched from dual sourcing to single sourcing or vice versa. 
 Lastly, counterfactual assignments are built within the existing relationships between a 
buyer and its suppliers and do not impose the condition that buyers create new supplier 
relationships. Reassigning tasks to existing suppliers keeps the focus of the estimation on the 
effect of variation in client-specific scope. On the contrary, the creation of new collaborations 
between buyers and other suppliers is required when the focus is on the matching of buyers and 
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suppliers and firms are assumed to have capacity constraints (see, e.g., Fox [2008] for an 
example).2 
 A feature that the formation of counterfactuals in our approach shares with the discrete 
choice methods is the exploitation of information from the revealed preferences of the players 
regarding the pairing of suppliers and tasks. There are, however, major differences between the 
discrete choice models and the inequalities-based approach (see discussion in Mindruta et al. 
2016, pp. 215-218 and Appendix S2). Notably, the inequalities-based approach does not impose 
a distribution on the error terms, nor does it assume the independence of irrelevant alternatives, 
and thus require fewer and less restrictive assumptions for estimation. 
Formal definitions 
 Recall that counterfactual formation involves taking one task at a time and reallocating it 
to a different supplier, while all other supplier-task pairings remain unchanged for a given buyer. 
Let a denote one of the tasks of buyer k. Holding the rest of the supplier-task pairings constant, 
one can focus on comparing the value created by the discrete assignment of actual supplier i to 
task a with the value of the counterfactual assignment of a supplier j to task a. Denote 𝑛𝑖𝑘 the 
client-specific scope of supplier i, i.e., the count of the number of tasks that supplier i takes care 
of for buyer k.  
 The incremental value ΔVik
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙(𝑎) created by the actual supplier i with observed scope 
of 𝑛𝑖 while taking on the 𝑛𝑖-th task a of buyer k can be written formally as: 
𝛥𝑉𝑖𝑘
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙(𝑎) = 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑖 − 𝐶𝑎𝑖 + 𝑠𝑛𝑖𝑘 + 𝜆𝑎𝑘 + 𝑎𝑖𝑘     (1) 
 Equation (1) means that the incremental value created is a function of the buyer’s 
willingness to pay for having supplier i on task a (𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑎); the supplier i’s opportunity cost for 
this task (Cai); and 𝑠𝑛𝑖𝑘, the incremental change in value from increasing the client-specific scope 
of supplier i from 𝑛𝑖𝑘 − 1 (the scope of supplier i if it were not to supply area a) to 𝑛𝑖𝑘 (its actual 
scope). We also include a buyer-task fixed effect 𝜆𝑎𝑘 and an error term 𝑎𝑖𝑘. Note that the error 
term should be interpreted as representing evaluation errors or any additional information not 
observed by the researcher that agents take into account prior to deciding on the allocation of 
tasks. 
                                                 
2 Fox (2007) compares the sum of the value created by two actual buyer–supplier pairs (e.g., A-X and B-
Y) to that of pairs where the partners are exchanged (A-Y and B-X). This approach underlies Mindruta’s 
(2013) study of alliance formation.  
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As it is central to our analysis, the formulation of incremental change 𝑠𝑛𝑖 deserves 
elaboration. Formally, 𝑠𝑛𝑖 is the product of the vector 𝑆 = (𝑠2, 𝑠3, … , 𝑠𝑁) of incremental change 
of value of client-specific scope for scope breadth of 2 (𝑠2) up to the maximum possible in the 
data (𝑠𝑁), with the supplier-specific vector of indicator variables 𝐷𝑖 = (𝑑2, 𝑑3, … , 𝑑𝑁) such that 
𝑑𝑛 is equal to 1 if the observed scope of supplier i  is equal to n, and zero otherwise. 
 In the counterfactual assignment, task a is given to supplier j. As a result, supplier j 
increases its client-specific scope from an observed njk to the counterfactual level of njk + 1, 
which means that we need to include 𝑠𝑛𝑗𝑘+1, rather than the observed 𝑠𝑛𝑗𝑘 , in the incremental 
value formula for the counterfactual. Thus, the incremental value that results from giving task a 
to supplier j is written: 
𝛥𝑉𝑗𝑘
𝐶𝐹(𝑎) = 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑗 − 𝐶𝑎𝑗 + 𝑠𝑛𝑗𝑘+1 + 𝜆𝑎𝑘 + 𝑎𝑗𝑘    (2) 
 For each task, the marginal value equations (1) and (2) disentangle the effect of suppliers’ 
value creation abilities to execute the task and the impact of a discrete change in the level of 
client-specific economy of scope. The terms willingness to pay 
(𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑖 , respectively 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑗) and cost (𝐶𝑎𝑖, respectively 𝐶𝑎𝑗) capture the heterogeneity in 
value creation across suppliers and tasks. In the empirical application, this feature of the model 
allows for suppliers to be strong in some tasks and weak in others. The terms 𝑠𝑛𝑖𝑘 and 
𝑠𝑛𝑗𝑘+1 capture the idea that adding an extra task to a supplier’s assignment may modify the joint 
value created. Thanks to these terms, the model allows for the value created to depend on the 
number of tasks that are carried out by a supplier, in addition to a supplier’s ability to create 
value in any particular task. Moreover, the model is agnostic regarding the sign of the 𝑠𝑛 terms, 
which may be different depending on 𝑛. Two alternative scenarios are plausible. If there is an 
optimal number of tasks to be grouped for a given supplier, we would expect 𝑠𝑛 to be positive 
for lower values of 𝑛 and decreasing up to the optimal 𝑛. Alternatively, suppose that undertaking 
any additional work involves fixed costs that are not related to the number of tasks a supplier 
fulfills for any given buyer. In this case we would expect 𝑠𝑛 to be negative for any level of 𝑛.  
 The assumption of unrestricted bargaining married with revealed preference implies that, 
holding other allocations constant, the incremental value created by assigning a supplier to a task 
is higher in the actual than in the counterfactual allocation:   
  ΔVik
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙(𝑎) >  𝛥𝑉𝑗𝑘
𝐶𝐹(𝑎)       (3) 
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 Equivalently: 
  𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑖 − 𝐶𝑎𝑖 + 𝑠𝑛𝑖𝑘 + 𝑎𝑖𝑘 >  𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑗 − 𝐶𝑎𝑗 + 𝑠𝑛𝑗𝑘+1 + 𝑎𝑗𝑘  (4) 
 Importantly, the buyer-task effect 𝜆ak, which was on both sides of the inequality, 
cancelled out. Indeed, these comparisons are made within alternative assignments of tasks to the 
existing suppliers of each individual buyer, which has the advantage of controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the buyer-task level and, implicitly, at the buyer level. 
 Panel 3 of Figure 1 illustrates the pairwise comparison of value creation for the example 
discussed in panels 1 and 3 of the same figure.   
Context and Data: The UK Corporate Legal Market 
Context 
 The empirical context for this study is the UK corporate legal market in the years 2002 to 
2006. The corporate clients (i.e., the buyers) are among the 250 largest market capitalizations of 
the London Stock Exchange and the suppliers are large British law firms (among the top 100 by 
size) and the London offices of large U.S. law firms. 3  
 The data on buyer–supplier relationships come from a survey conducted by Client 
Report, an industry trade magazine targeted at general counsels. The first four years of those data 
were also used in Chatain (2011). The survey was addressed to the general counsels of the 
corporate clients and produced a very high response rate. General counsels exposed the list of 
their main legal advisers and the legal areas in which they used them (i.e., the tasks). The 
definition of legal areas is the one commonly used in the industry and by market research firms. 
Table 2 shows one of these lists, detailing the legal supplier base of British Airways in 2005. 
=== Insert Table 2 about here === 
 In the data, law firm-client relationships typically lasted several years: the average yearly 
rate of law firm-client relationship termination was only 12.7%. Clients maintained multiple 
relationships simultaneously, with each client using yearly an average of 3.76 law firms. Over 
the time span of the study, the trend was toward contracting with more firms, with the average 
number of law firms per client at 3.17 in 2002 but rising steadily each year, to 4.25 in 2006 (t-
test of difference in mean is significant at 𝑝 < 0.0001). Clients needed advice in 4.48 legal areas 
                                                 
3 We use the term “client” for “buyer,” “law firm” for “supplier,” and “legal area” for “task” when 
referring to the details of the empirical context. 
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on average. With multiple law firms and multiple areas of work, the structure of the client–law 
firm interface is quite complex. 
On the one hand, clients may use a law firm across multiple legal areas. In the sample, 
35.8% of client–law firm relationships spanned more than one area in a given year. These 
relationships, involving a client-specific scope superior to 1, accounted for 59.2% of all area-
level observations. In other words, most sourcing decisions are taken against a backdrop of 
frequent cross-selling. On the other hand, clients may sometimes use different suppliers for the 
same area of legal work. In the Client Report survey, dual sourcing, whereby a given area of 
work is divided among several suppliers, concerned 21.7% of the year-firm-area cases. By 
construction, instances of concurrent sourcing (Parmigiani and Mitchell, 2009) are not reported 
in the survey.   
Moreover, the allocation of areas of legal work to suppliers appears more fluid than the 
relationships between buyers and suppliers, showing a process of dynamic reallocation over 
time. At the area level, excluding cases where the need for the area went away, the yearly rate of 
termination was 26.8%, more than twice the rate of termination of overall relationships (12.7%). 
Similarly, there was a yearly 40.0% rate of addition of suppliers at the area level.  
The emerging picture is consistent with previous research in the same setting (Chatain, 
2011), showing that buyers facing a need in a new legal area are much more likely to pick one of 
their existing suppliers rather than an outsider. This is also consistent with work in the U.S. 
corporate legal context (Coates, DeStefano, Nanda, and Wilkins, 2011) showing that clients 
maintain multiple deep relationships with law firms, while at the same time pick for specific 
areas those they think are the best fit.  
 To get a sense of the concentration of the procurement and the role of cross-selling, we 
compared the frequency of cross-selling in the data to that of a simulated benchmark where 
client areas are randomly and independently allocated to law in proportion to the law firms’ 
actual market share for the type of area. This preserves the law firms’ level of activity, but forces 
cross-selling to only occur by chance, muting the role of client-specific scope while preserving 
that of law firms’ capabilities. Figure 2 compares the actual distribution of client-specific scope 
(the number of areas a law firm sells to a client) with the simulated distribution. Strikingly, most 
of the areas (79.1%) in the simulated data are part of relationships of scope equal to 1 (no cross-
selling), while the majority of observed ties (59.2%) are in relationships of scope equal to 2 or 
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more (indicating cross-selling). This shows that clients and law firms undertake a lot more cross-
selling than chance would explain. Our empirical analysis will explore why. 
=== Insert Figure 2 about here === 
Sample 
Over the five-year span of 2002 to 2006, there were a total of 1,229 answers (out of a 
possible maximum of 1,250), each constituted by the set of law firms working for a client and 
the legal areas in which they were involved for this client, for a total of 7,291 year-client-firm-
area observations. The constraints imposed by the scope of the estimation and limitations on the 
availability of cost data restricted the analysis to 5,502 buyer–task–supplier ties (75.5%) out of 
the 7,291 originally given in the survey. Because the method exploits the variation within a 
buyer’s supplier base, we dropped buyers that either used only one firm for all their needs or 
mentioned only one type of legal need. Moreover, the information on quality and cost was 
missing for some suppliers mentioned in the survey. The lack of ranking (quality) data on quality 
is captured by a dummy variable. We dropped the observations for which cost was not available. 
 The remaining 119 law firms included in the analysis are the largest and most prominent 
in the market. Given the overlap with the top 100 law firm rankings, our sample captures a large 
share of the legal business conducted in the UK in numbers of lawyers and turnover (Cole, 2004) 
and, presumably, the lion’s share of the corporate legal business. In our final sample, the average 
number of law firms per client is slightly higher than in the full survey data (3.98 vs. 3.77), as is 
the proportion of ties that are part of cross-selling relationships (62.1% vs. 59.2%). The 
breakdown of legal areas by type remains very similar.  
 The number of combinations of legal areas and locations (London, rest of England and 
Wales, Scotland) is very large. The most commonly found legal area and place was corporate 
finance in London (17.4% of observations). One law firm garnered 16.1% of the ties, while the 
average market share was 8.6%. The largest market share in the top 19 legal areas (which 
together comprise 80.8% of the ties) was 26.3% (banking in London), suggesting that alternative 
suppliers were usually available to clients. 
Variables 
 This setting offers fine-grained data on the span of buyer–supplier relationships. At noted 
before, our empirical strategy implicitly includes buyer-year fixed effects, removing the need to 
control for time-varying buyer characteristics. 
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Quality ratings. As a proxy for willingness-to-pay for expertise, we used the yearly 
recommendations for law firms in multiple legal areas produced by Chambers and Partners, the 
parent firm of Client Report. We relied on publicly available financial data on the top law firms 
to construct a proxy for the cost of production. These sources of data are reviewed in turn.  
 We derived the ratings of quality from the yearly reports published by Chambers and 
Partners’ Guides to the UK Legal Profession. Each guide presents the rankings of recommended 
firms in over 60 areas of law. This guide has been consistently published every year since 1990 
and is acknowledged as one of the two leading providers of information about the UK legal 
market. The guide is a result of six months of research (January to June) by a team of 30 lawyers 
and legal journalists. Firms are ranked within tiered lists. According to Chambers and Partners, 
the rankings are meant to reflect “technical legal ability, professional conduct, client service, 
commercial awareness/astuteness, diligence, commitment, and other qualities that the client 
considers relevant” (Ghosh, 2005). We used these rankings to construct the supplier quality 
rating, which takes values between 0 and 1, from lowest to highest ranking. We created a 
separate dummy variable for suppliers not being listed (no ranking). When the quality ratings are 
matched to the buyer–supplier relationship data, there is a higher proportion of ties going to 
suppliers with higher ratings, reflecting a correlation between rating and law firm market share in 
the FTSE 250. While examining buyer–supplier relationships in a given year, we use the 
previous year’s information on rankings.  
 Opportunity cost of lawyers. We used financial information available for the top 100 UK 
law firms and top 25 foreign law firms in London to create a proxy for the cost of providing legal 
services. We compiled this information from the yearly league tables provided by the trade 
publications Legal Business and The Lawyer. We constructed a measure of cost per lawyer, 
calculated by dividing the total cost of a firm by its number of practicing lawyers, including 
partners and non-partners. This metric is widely reported in league tables and used in trade 
journals.  
 The main component of the costs of a law firm consists of salaries for administrative staff 
members and lawyers who are not partners. The opportunity cost of these employees can be 
measured by their salaries, which can be thought of as reflecting their marginal product in the job 
market and thus the value of their next best use in the economy. In contrast, the opportunity cost 
of partners is not as easily measured. For our purpose, we will assume it is equal to zero in the 
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short run. The reason is that partners are committed to the law firm and cannot switch jobs as 
easily as a salaried lawyer in the short run. Moreover, while constructing counterfactuals, we 
made the assumption that firms were not capacity constrained, which enabled them to take 
another piece of business if available. As partners have some capacity to spare, no value creation 
is forgone in the short run and the opportunity cost is zero. As a result, the ratio of total cost to 
total number of lawyers (salaried lawyers and partners) can be understood as a proxy for the 
short-run opportunity cost of the firm’s main suppliers.  
 Relationship length. In order to account for accumulated relationship-specific experience, 
we create a variable that indicates that a spell of relationship is left-censored. We also count the 
number of years a relationship is observed between the client and the law firm. 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics and cross-correlations at the area level for client-
specific scope, cost per lawyer, quality rating, no ranking, left-censored relationship, and 
relationship length. 
=== Insert Table 3 about here === 
Estimation 
 To form the estimator, we first rewrite the marginal value expressions (1) and (2) into 
their empirical counterparts, replacing each theoretical term by its corresponding variable in the 
dataset and the parameters to be estimated (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿2, … , 𝛿𝑁). In a basic specification, the 
willingness-to-pay component of the formulas becomes 𝛼 ⋅ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑖 (or 𝛼 ⋅ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑗),  where 𝛼 
is the parameter to estimate. Likewise, the opportunity cost component is replaced by the cost-
per-lawyer variable and the parameter β to estimate, 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐶𝑝𝑙𝑖 (or 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐶𝑝𝑙𝑗𝑖). The influence of 
scope on value creation is measured by the vector of parameters (𝛿2, … , 𝛿𝑁) , which is the 
empirical counterpart to the vector (𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑁). In keeping with equations (1) and (2), 𝑠𝑛𝑖 is 
replaced by 𝛿𝑛𝑖𝑘 and 𝑠𝑛𝑗+1 is replaced by 𝛿𝑛𝑖𝑘+1 in equations (5) and (6). 
We thus obtain the following expressions for the empirical counterparts of the marginal 
value equations:  
 𝛥𝑉𝑖𝑘
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙(𝑎, 𝛩) =  𝛼 ⋅ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑖 − 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐶𝑝𝑙𝑖 + 𝛿𝑛𝑖𝑘 + 𝜆𝑎𝑘 + 𝑎𝑖𝑘 ,   (5) 
 𝛥𝑉𝑗𝑘
𝐶𝐹(𝑎, 𝛩) =  𝛼 ⋅ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑗 − 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐶𝑝𝑙𝑗 + 𝛿𝑛𝑗𝑘+1 + 𝜆𝑎𝑘 +  𝑎𝑗𝑘.    (6) 
 Taken together, the expressions (1) - (6) lead to the following inequality: 
𝛼 ⋅ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑖 − 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐶𝑝𝑙𝑖 + 𝛿𝑛𝑖𝑘 + 𝑎𝑖𝑘 >   𝛼 ⋅ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑗 − 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐶𝑝𝑙𝑗 + 𝛿𝑛𝑗𝑘+1 + 𝑎𝑗𝑘   (7) 
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 In the estimation procedure we seek to find the set of parameters 𝛩 = (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿2, … , 𝛿𝑁)  
that satisfies the highest number of inequalities (7) in the data. Technically, the estimates are 
those that maximize the following objective function: 
 𝑄(𝛩) =   ∑  𝑘∈𝐾 ∑  𝑎∈𝐴𝑘 ∑  𝑖∈𝑀𝑎𝑘 ∑ 𝟏𝑗∈𝑀𝑘/{𝑖} {𝛥𝑉𝑖𝑘
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙(𝑎, 𝛩) ≥ 𝛥𝑉𝑗𝑘
𝐶𝐹(𝑎, 𝛩)}  (7) 
 In this equation, 𝐾 is the set of buyers, 𝑀𝑎𝑘 is the set of suppliers serving buyer 𝑘, 𝐴𝑖𝑘 is 
the set of tasks that supplier 𝑖 is fulfilling for buyer 𝑘 and 𝟏{⋅} is an indicator function, equal to 1 
when the expression in brackets is true, and 0 otherwise. The indicator function 𝟏{⋅} takes a 
value of 1 if the inequality 𝛥𝑉𝑖𝑘
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙(𝑎, 𝛩) ≥ 𝛥𝑉𝑗𝑘
𝐶𝐹(𝑎, 𝛩) is true for parameters {𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿2, … , 𝛿𝑁}. 
The function 𝑄(𝛩) then sums these indicator functions over all tasks and all buyers.  
 The function 𝑄(𝛩)is a step function. To find its maximum (and thus, the coefficient 
estimates for which the maximum is attained), we follow Santiago and Fox (2009) and apply the 
differential evolution algorithm (Storn and Price, 1997). We compute the confidence intervals 
around the point estimates using the subsampling procedure (Politis, Romano and Wolf, 1999), 
which gives consistent estimates for the maximum score estimator.4 We implement the 
estimation in Mathematica 10.0 by adapting the toolkit developed and made available by 
Santiago and Fox (2009). 
 This estimator relies on a minimal assumption concerning the error term: the rank order 
property for probability of choice. This assumption states that when comparing two alternatives, 
the one with the highest value, net of the error term, has a higher probability of being selected, 
Importantly, this assumption does not impose a specific distribution on the error terms, and 
arbitrary patterns of heteroskedasticity are permitted (Horowitz, 1998: 71). The estimator is 
consistent, even when it is only used over a subset of the choices available (Fox, 2008). Further, 
the estimator performs well in small samples and situations where the logit model is misspecified 
(Fox, 2008).5 
                                                 
4Subsampling draws samples without replacement, while the bootstrap draws samples with replacement. 
The bootstrap is inconsistent when used with a maximum score estimator (Abrevaya and Huang, 2005). 
Subsampling is more conservative, requiring weaker assumptions on the distribution of the 
unobservables, but converges at a lower rate (cube root of sample size) than the bootstrap (square root). 
5 The maximum score estimator was originally developed for a discrete choice model by Manski (1975). 
Fox (2007, 2008, 2010) develops this line of research and shows that the maximum score estimator can be 
used for estimations based on necessary conditions formulated as inequalities. 
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 As in discrete choice models, the estimator requires a scale normalization on the vector 
𝛩 = (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿2, … , 𝛿𝑛) (Fox, 2010).  We follow the standard procedure and impose that one 
coefficient (here, the coefficient 𝛼 of the rating variable) has the value of ± 1, which will scale 
the other coefficient estimates. The sign of this coefficient is identified by choosing it to be the 
sign that yields a better fit of the model. To this purpose, we run each model specification twice, 
once for 𝛼 =1 and once for 𝛼 =-1, and we choose the sign returning a higher number of 
predicted inequalities. Consistent with the expectation that supplier rating has a positive effect on 
value creation, the positive sign of the rating has always led to a better model fit in our sample.  
Results 
Results are shown on Table 4. Column 1 shows a baseline model including quality rating 
as the scaling factor, the cost per lawyer, and a dummy for the case when the law firm is not 
ranked at all. The 95% confidence interval for the cost per lawyer variable is entirely below zero. 
In column 2, we introduce further variables to account for the length of a relationship 
between a law firm and its client. The effect associated with the left-censored variable, which 
picks up the possibility that there is already an ongoing relationship of unknown length between 
the law firm and the client, is small and positive. This magnitude is not surprising as the variable 
pools existing long-lasting relationships with relationships that have just started. The relationship 
length variable counts the number of years a relationship has been observed in the data between 
the law firm and the client. It is indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels of 
significance. The cost per lawyer remains negative (95% confidence interval [-3.38, -0.39]). 
=== Insert Table 4 about here === 
Column 3 refines the analysis by introducing the possibility of a non-linear effect with a 
squared relationship length as a variable. The magnitude of the effect is very small, even if it sits 
in the 90% confidence interval away from zero. Moreover, the explanatory power of the model 
(percentage of inequalities correctly predicted) is virtually unchanged, at about 77%. While we 
cannot rule out the nonlinear effects, they do not seem explain enough of the phenomenon, and 
we will not pursue this path further. 
In column 4, we introduce the main set of variables of interest: dummy variables 
capturing the incremental benefit from changes in client-specific scope when moving away from 
the observed level of scope (breadth) of the relationships. These are the variables δ2 to δ5, with δn 
estimating the value created or lost if the client-specific scope attains n, starting from n-1. 
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Because there are few instances when the client-specific scope of a law firm is higher than 5 in 
the data, we created one dummy (δ5) to capture all changes in scope higher than 5.  
The introduction of dummy variables of scope extension markedly improves the fit of the 
model (see column 4). Now, 87% of the inequalities are correctly predicted. The 95% confidence 
intervals of these variables are all clearly bounded away from zero. All coefficients are strongly 
negative, with magnitude above 1, which means that extending the client-specific scope by one 
additional area has more impact on value creation than an improvement in reputation rating that 
would take a firm from not being ranked to the top of the rankings. Meanwhile, the estimated 
coefficient for costs and not being ranked become hard to distinguish from zero, while the left 
censored variable keeps its magnitude. 
In unreported analyses, we restricted the sample to counterfactuals involving either the 
more reputed law firms or those with a history of repeated transactions with the focal client. By 
focusing on law firms that clients have arguably the most information on, our goal was to test 
whether the results were sensitive to the definition of the set of alternatives that the clients might 
consider. The results were similar to those involving the full sample, indicating that our main 
results are not driven by the inclusion of potentially irrelevant counterfactuals. 
These estimates, which by construction take into account the value creation alternatives 
available in a configuration of client–law area–supplier, suggest that a lot of value is lost in the 
relationships by increasing marginally the scope of the supplier. This is consistent with the idea 
that incremental benefits from scope become gradually exhausted until they become smaller than 
the inevitable, though small, fixed costs associated with scope extension.  
This finding does not result mechanically from the way the estimates were calculated. 
Under the null hypothesis, the observed scope would be explained only by the merits of each 
firm in terms of quality, cost, and relationship length, and existing scope levels would not matter 
for value creation. Accordingly, the estimates of scope increase variables would be equal to zero 
as the current preferences for the allocation of suppliers to tasks would be purely explained by 
variables other than the client-specific economies of scope.  
There are two other plausible scenarios in the buyer–supplier setting. In a first scenario, if 
scope extensions (net of intrinsic quality and costs) are triggered by a better ability to create 
synergies at higher levels of client-specific scope, we could plausibly observe small positive 
values for the coefficients capturing the increase in scope. Then, broader scope would still be 
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beneficial at the observed margin, but no more extension would happen when suppliers lack 
intrinsic ability in the areas they do not serve (as measured by the rankings). Secondly, it is 
possible that scope extensions might already destroy value at lower levels of operation, but that 
these losses are still less costly than the alternative of creating a relationship with a supplier 
lacking prior experience with the client. Here, we would expect a negative impact on value 
creation of the marginal scope increase. We will probe this explanation later when we estimate a 
lower bound on the cost of creating a relationship. 
The results strongly suggest that there are no more gains (but actually losses) to scope 
expansion beyond the observed levels in the sample, leaving open the question of the nature and 
magnitude of the marginal gains to a wider client-specific scope on value creation. Indeed, while 
scope extensions beyond the observed scope are value destructive, it does not mean that this is 
also necessarily true for scope extensions at lower levels of breadth (i.e., when suppliers are 
executing one or a small number of tasks for a buyer). By design, the thought experiment 
underlying our estimates does not formally estimate how changes in client-specific scope affect 
value creation when these changes are far away from the observed levels of client-specific scope. 
This is because the changes we estimate are only of one task more or less than what is observed. 
However, we can estimate whether there is a total effect of breadth on value creation. By 
introducing the breadth of scope (number of areas served) as a variable in the model, we can test 
if there is an intrinsic preference for breadth, keeping in mind that the marginal return of scope 
increase is negative. The results, presented in column 5, show a negative and weak total effect of 
scope on value. The dummies for scope extension are removed due to collinearity issues. The 
hardly distinguishable from zero coefficient of the breadth of scope could be interpreted as the 
sum of positive effects up to the point where they become negative, as found in the previous 
regressions. It implies moderate positive effects across tasks when clients and suppliers gradually 
increase the breadth of their relationship. However, these effects are exhausted at the observed 
level of scope.  
APPLICATION: USING THE ESTIMATES TO ASSESS STRATEGIC DECISIONS 
A natural way to take advantage of the empirical estimates of value creation to gain a 
better understanding of competition in the UK corporate legal market is to use these coefficients 
in conjunction with simple cooperative games. We now analyze a few fictional situations 
involving clients and law firms. The goal is to show how the estimates of the factors driving 
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value creation obtained in the previous section can be used to provide concrete advice to firms 
involved in competitive interactions. 
Seizing a new opportunity and the cost of creating a new relationship 
When a buyer has a new legal need, a new opportunity is offered to existing suppliers. 
However, this opportunity represents a new competitive ground as suppliers vie to capture it. 
Factoring in both capability and scope can help us understand better for whom, and to what 
extent, the new opportunity can be profitable. Consider the example depicted in Table 5. 
=== Insert Table 5 about here === 
The buyer has had needs for three areas of business (i.e., tasks; columns 1 to 3) and now 
needs services in another area 4 (column 4). It is currently using two suppliers. Each cell of the 
table gives the rating and the cost of a supplier’s work in a given area. An X designates when a 
supplier is actually working on the task for the buyer. We see that supplier 1 works on task 1, 
while supplier 2 works on tasks 2 and 3. 
For simplicity, we assume that all the error terms in equation (1) and (2) are equal to 
zero. In this example, supplier 1 is serving the buyer in area 1, while supplier 2 is serving the 
buyer in areas 2 and 3. Notice that this arrangement is value maximizing assuming that the cost 
of creating a buyer–supplier relationship is sunk. Cost variables are set at identical values across 
suppliers so that they do not affect decisions. The ratings for suppliers 1 and 2 are, for the 
moment, left at unspecified values 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1 and 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔2, respectively. 
Given current scope and capabilities, which supplier is better placed to profitably serve 
the buyer in area 4? Compare the increments of value that each supplier would be able to create 
if it were to serve area 4 in addition to those it already serves, using rounded values of the 
estimates from model 5 of Table 4. 
Supplier 1’s incremental value created is superior to that of supplier 2 if and only if: 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1 − 𝛽 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 +  𝛿2 > 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔2 − 𝛽 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡2 +  𝛿3 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1 − 𝛽 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔2 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡2 > 𝛿3 −  𝛿2 
The combined quality and cost advantage of supplier 1 over supplier 2 should be more 
than the difference between dis-synergies associated with a scope increasing to 3 for supplier 1 
and to 2 for supplier 2 (i.e., 𝛿3 − 𝛿2). Replacing the symbols by the estimated values, the 
condition can be rewritten as: 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1 − 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔2 >  −1.80 + 1.85 = 0.05 
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This gap in ratings can be compared to the standard deviation of 0.30 found for the 
quality variable in the sample. The comparatively lower increase in dis-synergies that supplier 2 
would have to deal with only gives it a minimal advantage. Unless the gap in quality between the 
two suppliers is relatively high, the buyer will be able to extract a lot of value by pitting the two 
suppliers against each other. 
Now modify the example so that supplier 2’s scope is equal to 3 (instead of 2). The 
capability advantage required so that supplier 1 is creating more value is equal to: 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1 − 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔2 >  𝛿4 −  𝛿2 =  −1.48 + 1.85 = 0.37 
This is a much higher hurdle to overcome. At that level of client-specific scope, supplier 2’s 
incremental penalty from scope expansion (-1.48) is lower than supplier 1’s (-1.85), which 
represents a substantial gap of 0.37—more than one standard deviation in the rating measure. 
Because it has a wider client-specific scope and there are some relative increasing returns 
associated with broader scope, supplier 2 has an advantage. 
Estimating the cost of creating a new buyer–supplier relationship 
Armed with these estimates, we can calculate lower bounds for the cost of adding another 
buyer–supplier relationship and expanding the set of alternative suppliers. We start from the 
following observation: If client-specific scope extensions are value reducing, as we found in the 
analysis, and yet buyers are not taking steps to restrict suppliers’ client-specific scope, the 
implication is that the cost of expanding scope is less than that of creating an additional buyer–
supplier relationship. We explore this idea in the simplest case that consists of reducing the scope 
of an existing supplier from n to n-1 and adding a new supplier with client-specific scope equal 
to 1. Formally, consider the value creation of actual supplier i with overall client-specific scope 
𝑛𝑖  in task a, and compare it to the alternative of creating a relationship with supplier j at cost R. 
Omitting fixed effects (which cancel out) and assuming other unobservables are equal to zero, 
we have: 
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 + 𝑠𝑛𝑖 > 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑗 − 𝐶𝑗 − 𝑅  
   𝑅 > −𝑠𝑛𝑖 + (𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑗 − 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑖) + (𝐶𝑖 − 𝐶𝑗)  (3) 
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 This inequality is valid for all instances of one supplier having a client-specific scope 
equal or superior to two tasks and it defines a lower bound RLB on R. 
We can make several assumptions on the extent of the difference in value creation 
between j and i, net of scope effects. A neutral assumption is to consider that the buyer could 
find a similar supplier so that WTPai – Costj = WTPaj – Costi. Another, more optimistic 
assumption is that the buyer could establish a relationship with the best alternative supplier 
possible, the one for which WTPaj - Costj is maximum among all suppliers. 
Taking these assumptions to the data with the estimates from model 4 of Table 4, we can 
compute a lower bound for the cost of creating a relationship in the status quo scenario of no 
improvement in supplier value creation (𝑅𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 𝑄𝑢𝑜
𝐿𝐵 ), and another, tighter (i.e., of superior value) 
lower bound in the best alternative supplier scenario (𝑅𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
𝐿𝐵 ). Table 6 shows the results 
of these calculations, and Figure 3 shows the empirical cumulative distribution of the values for 
the lower bounds. The mean value for 𝑅𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 𝑄𝑢𝑜
𝐿𝐵  is 1.74, and that for 𝑅𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
𝐿𝐵  is 2.09. 
These are substantially high values, given that they are expressed in units of quality rating, with 
the value of 1 corresponding to the gap between the lowest-ranked firm and the top firm. 
=== Insert Figure 3 and Table 6 about here === 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Implications for value creation in vertical relationships and supplier horizontal scope 
Previous work has argued that when a supplier is simultaneously performing different 
tasks for one client, additional value creation could be achieved via client-specific scope 
economies (Chatain and Zemsky, 2007). Our estimates show a cost of extending scope within 
existing relationships. This cost is the net result of (dis)economies of scope coming from the 
demand side (clients) and the supply side (suppliers) as well as from their interaction. We cannot 
distinguish between the two directly from our estimates, which means that there are potentially 
multiple mechanisms at play. 
On the demand side, and given an already existing relationship, a number of reasons may 
explain why a client might be wary to let a supplier increase its client-specific scope. First, a 
broader client-specific scope could bring in fears of conflicts of interest. However, in this setting, 
the norm is not to deal with a client in any capacity if there is the smallest conflict of interest 
even in a different legal area, ruling out this concern. Another possibility is that clients may be 
afraid of being held up in the future and purposely refrain from allocating a large a share of their 
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legal work to any given supplier. However, if this were the only reason for negative scope effect, 
we would expect estimated coefficients to be become more negative as scope increases, which is 
not consistent with the pattern uncovered by our analysis. Finally, it can be that clients value a 
diversity of opinions across suppliers and that they are afraid of putting too much weight on any 
given supplier. Overall, when looking at demand-side factors, such preferences for diversity of 
opinion or of sources of supply could partially explain the negative result. 
On the supply side, a key driver of the cost of expanding scope may be the up-front cost 
that a law firm has to bear when acquiring knowledge specific to the client in a new legal area. 
Further, it is possible that internal conflicts could make the coordination between tasks more 
costly for integrated than for distinct providers. For instance, partners within the integrated firm 
may inefficiently spend time and resources to determine who is in charge of a particular client. 
Alternatively, the costs can reflect the existence of binding capacity constraints in undertaking 
additional legal workload. However, due to the relative elasticity of supply of partner work 
(Chatain and Meyer-Doyle, Forthcoming), such constraints are not prevalent in the sample. 
Overall, on the supply side, we believe that the simplest explanation is the existence of costs of 
expanding due to learning about the client, even though other types of costs cannot be ruled out. 
Given all these considerations, why do scope extensions occur in spite of the patterns of 
dis-synergies found in the value creation function? Our analysis suggests that suppliers may 
achieve scope economies by economizing on the cost of creating a relationship, rather than by 
reducing costs within the existing relationships. Starting a new relationship is subject to set-up 
costs and the estimate of the lower bound of these costs is substantially high. Some of these costs 
can be due to the need to invest in relationship-specific assets, routines, and knowledge 
(Crawford, 1990; Dyer and Singh, 1998). Forming new relationships may also be subject to 
higher governance-related costs than continuing an existing relationship, as new ties occur under 
the shadow of potential holdup (Klein, 1996), while existing relationships are sustained by the 
value of relational contracts (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002; Board, 2011). In Board’s 
(2011) model, the cost of creating a new relationship is a manifestation of a buyer’s deliberate 
bias toward current suppliers, which is intended to reduce the probability of holdup by 
guaranteeing them enough value capture if the relationship is sustained. In sum, the high cost of 
creating a relationship that we found could be a combination of costly relationship-specific 
investments (time and resources), and governance-related bias toward insiders. 
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While the interpretation in terms of relational contracts emphasizes the rationality of such 
bias, another interpretation is that this bias represents a form of cognitive lock-in (Uzzi, 1997). 
However, qualitative evidence in a comparable empirical context pictures astute clients 
consciously maintaining a balance of close relationships (creating bias toward insiders) and 
competition between insiders when allocating specific tasks (Coates et al, 2011), which gives 
less credence to a cognitive lock-in interpretation. In sum, even though we are not able to fully 
untangle the mechanisms driving the effects of dis-synergies and new relationship creation on 
value creation, there is evidence that several opposing forces are simultaneously at work. 
Future research can help further unpack these mechanisms and enrich those that are taken 
into account in the analysis. Two venues are worth investigating. The first is to produce a finer-
grained understanding of the value of co-specialization between buyers and suppliers. For this 
analysis, measures of the potential for co-specialization at the level of the product could be 
introduced, as in Elfenbein and Zenger (2014). The second venue is to explore potential sources 
of complementarities between tasks. Such analysis could also be incorporated in the same 
revealed preference framework, by adding indicator variables for additional value created (or 
destroyed) when the same supplier does two specific types of tasks. 
Implications for empirical work in value-based strategies 
The results speak to the inter-firm relationship literature, but the paper’s broader 
motivation is to demonstrate how combining the fundamental assumptions of value-based theory 
(Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996) with the logic of revealed preferences can enable further 
empirical progress beyond early work demonstrating correlations (Chatain, 2011) or treatment 
effects (Bennett, 2011) consistent with the theory. By exploiting the information in the 
completed transactions and systematically analyzing how these transactions differ from well-
defined counterfactuals, our approach makes it possible to estimate the relative importance of 
various drivers of value creation. While prior work, such as Fosfuri and Giarratana (2009), has 
focused on the effect of competitive actions (e.g., advertising, product introduction) on value 
capture by an individual firm (e.g., Tobin’s Q) we provide a step forward toward fully 
decomposing the causal path going from firm investment to firm profit via value creation. 
In addition to buyer–supplier relationships, the methods developed in this paper can be 
applied to most datasets listing observed relationships in supply chains, network of firms and 
ecosystems. The essential data requirements are observations of existing trading relationships 
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and the definition of a set of credible counterfactuals. In this respect, our empirical method 
follows a similar heuristic to that underlying recent theoretical work by Gans and Ryall 
(forthcoming) and Montez, Ruiz-Aliseda, and Ryall (forthcoming). 
Implications for practitioners 
Our method expands how practitioners can use data for strategy analysis by analyzing 
strategic interactions “out of the sample”. With the parameters estimated from data taken from 
real situations, cooperative games can be applied to understand the challenges faced by the 
various players. For instance, it is possible to quantify the trade-offs between value creation from 
capability and from client-specific scope, which allows for an understanding of the relative 
strength of firms in different competitive scenarios. Matching these analyses of the competitive 
environment with an internal analysis of what a given firm can do and at what costs would 
provide a complete picture of the trade-offs a firm faces and would be a valuable tool for 
decision making with respect to resource allocation and organizational commitments. 
Limitations 
Our results should be viewed in light of some important boundary conditions and 
limitations given our parsimonious model of value creation. A key assumption of this paper 
(‘unrestricted bargaining’) implies that firms can contemplate many different deals prior to 
determining the final allocation of tasks to suppliers. This assumption fits well in the context of 
our analysis: corporate clients can easily shift from a current law firm to another since there are 
no long term contracts in this setting, and prospective partners, having ongoing relationships, 
know each other very well. Moreover, even though law firms usually bill hourly rates, they have 
latitude to adjust their billings if necessary to keep clients happy. However, this assumption may 
not be appropriate in settings where institutions prevent bargaining and instead favor take-it-or-
leave-it offers (e.g., auctions, posted prices) or where institutions are inadequate to protect 
exchanges so that there is less bargaining (and transactions) than expected (e.g., appropriability 
concerns in the markets for technology). Alternatively, it might be that bargaining is possible but 
that the set of partners who are attainable is limited due to frictions (Chatain and Zemsky, 2011). 
In this latter case, our method is still applicable but will likely produce less precise estimates as 
there are fewer relevant counterfactuals to be constructed. 
 Another issue is that of selection into the sample studied, leading us to overestimate the 
severity of the cost of scope expansion. Our analysis did not use data on clients who dealt 
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exclusively with one law firm because in this case there are no counterfactuals to be constructed. 
If exclusive relationships involved suppliers who were unusually good at creating synergies 
between tasks, our estimates of synergies would be potentially biased downward as these 
suppliers were selected out of the sample. However, in our data, all but one of the law firms who 
were in a position of single-sourcing were also supplying other clients and were otherwise very 
well represented in the data we exploited. This aspect alleviates the concern that the negative 
coefficients of scope expansion were driven by the composition of the sample. Another 
interpretation is that some clients had a stronger preference for single sourcing and selected 
themselves into having exclusive relationships, hence dropping out of the sample. This scenario 
opens the possibility that our estimates of the value created by scope extension might be biased 
downward compared to the population average due to selection on the client side.  
Finally, the counterfactuals assume that capacity constraints on the supply side are not 
binding (suppliers can serve one more area in the counterfactuals). The negative sign on the 
scope extension coefficients could be interpreted as evidence for such capacity constraints. 
However, interviews with actors in the market never revealed capacity constraints as a reason for 
not serving a client. Instead, there is evidence that partners of law firms can go to great length to 
ensure that they can serve all the needs of their clients, either by stretching themselves thin or by 
redistributing work within their firm (Chatain and Meyer-Doyle, Forthcoming).  
Conclusion 
In this paper, we developed and applied a new set of empirical tools for scholars in the 
value-based stream of research. We relied on the idea that “no good deal comes undone,” a 
foundational principle of the value-based approach, to develop empirical analyses relying on 
revealed preferences to estimate drivers of value creation. Thanks to this novel approach, we 
analyzed data on buyer–supplier relationships in the UK corporate legal market and uncovered 
evidence for mechanisms that traditional methods could not easily distinguish from each other. 
Future work could rely and expand on this methodology in many settings of interest to strategic 
management and provide estimates of drivers of value creation that are theoretically consistent 
with the competitive assumptions of the value-based framework.  
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TABLES 
Table 1. Value creation scenarios in the extended example 
Panel 1  Panel 2 
Supplier vAi vBi  Supplier vAi vBi 
1 10 0  4 10 0 
2 3 10  5 3 10 
3 8 8  6 9 8 
 
Table 2. British Airways’ suppliers of legal services (2005) 
Law firm (supplier) Area of legal service (task) 
Addleshaw Goddard Commercial 
Addleshaw Goddard Employment 
Addleshaw Goddard TMT 
Baker & McKensie Employment 
Bristows IP 
Gates & Partners Aviation 
Gates & Partners Insurance 
Slaughter and May Corporate finance 
Slaughter and May Projects 
Slaughter and May Tax 
Slaughter and May Commercial 
Wragge & Co LLP IP 
Wragge & Co LLP Litigation 
Wragge & Co LLP Property 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlation table 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) Client-specific scope 2.22 1.31 1 9 1 
    
(2) Cost per lawyer 0.16 0.04 0.05 0.47 0.05 1 
   
(3) Quality ranking 0.69 0.30 0 1 -0.03 -0.05 1 
  
(4) Not ranked 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.04 0.05 -0.73 1 
 
(5) Left-censored rel. 0.79 0.41 0 1 0.17 -0.01 0.08 -0.11 1 
(6) Relationship length 2.36 1.33 1 5 0.22 0.08 0.13 -0.09 0.22 
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Table 4. Estimation results 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Quality rating +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 
 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Cost per lawyer -1.34 -1.20 -1.22 -0.21 -0.27 
  [-3.47, -0.62] [-3.38, -0.39] [-3.27, -0.42] [-2.91, 0.62] [-4.72, 0.95] 
Not ranked -0.15 -5.23 -4.23 -0.33 -3.80 
 
[-0.33, 108.81] [-8.50, -1.40] [-6.78, -0.23] [-0.52, 0.11] [-5.36, 4.48] 
Left censored 
 
0.24 0.21 0.39 0.46 
  
[0.07, 0.62] [-0.01, 0.57] [0.05, 0.86] [-0.55, 1.03] 
Relationship length 
 
-0.04 -0.28 -0.06 -0.07 
  
[-0.30, 0.06] [-0.81, 0.04] [-0.31, 0.11] [-0.41, 0.15] 
Relationship length squared 
 
0.05 
  
  
  
[-0.01, 0.14] 
  
δ2 
   
-1.85 
 
    
[-2.23, -1.32] 
 
δ3 
   
-1.80 
 
    
[-2.22, -1.23] 
 
δ4 
   
-1.48 
 
    
[-1.89, -0.97] 
 
δ5 and more 
   
-1.49 
 
  
   
[-1.90, -0.97] 
 
No. of other areas served 
    
-0.45 
     
[-0.57, 0.47] 
No. inequalities 17763 17763 17763 17763 17763 
No. inequalities satisfied 13615 13658 13662 15409 14345 
Percentage inequ. satisfied 76.6% 76.9% 76.9% 86.7% 80.8% 
Estimation time 2.29 7.86 11.82 13.54 11.32 
Number subsamples 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Subsampling time 1077.35 3012.44 4693.72 6708.20 4819.24 
Note: Subsampled asymmetric 95% confidence intervals in brackets. 
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Table 5. Current allocation of tasks to suppliers and supplier characteristics 
 Buyer’s needs per task 
 Current needs New need 
Supplier Task 1 Observed Task 2 Observed Task 3 Observed Task 4 Observed 
Supplier 1 Rating 1.0 X 0.2  0.0  Rating_1 ? 
 Cost 0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16  
Supplier 2 Rating 0.0  0.4 X 1.0 X Rating_2 ? 
 Cost 0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16  
 
Table 6. Implied lower bounds on cost of search and relationship creation 
Lower bound Mean Median Min. Max. 
𝑅𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 𝑄𝑢𝑜
𝐿𝐵  1.74 1.80 1.48 1.85 
𝑅𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
𝐿𝐵  2.09 2.03 1.48 3.73 
 
Notes: The estimations are scaled by the quality variable. The lower bound on the cost of entry is 
obtained by computing the value that would be saved by reducing the scope of a current supplier 
if its scope is 2 or more, and substituting it by an outside supplier. The logic is that the cost of 
search and relationship creation has to be at least as high as this figure to rationalize why buyers 
are not creating an extra relationship with a supplier. In the calculations for 𝑅𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 𝑄𝑢𝑜
𝐿𝐵 , the 
outside supplier is assumed to create as much value as the supplier currently serving the buyer. 
In the calculations for 𝑅𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
𝐿𝐵 , the outside supplier is assumed to be the best in the 
market in terms of quality–cost wedge. The estimates from model 4 of Table 4 were used to 
quantify the contributions of quality and cost to value creation. A total of 3,415 cases were used. 
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Figure 1. Creation of counterfactuals from observed data. 
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Figure 2. Observed and simulated client-specific scope. 
 
 
Figure 3: Empirical cumulative distribution function for lower bound of entry cost with best 
possible alternative supplier (solid line) and status quo supplier (broken line). The graph reads as 
follows: To explain 75% of the observed cases where there is no new relationship created, the 
cost of creating a new relationship needs to be at least equal to 1.85 if a new supplier is just as 
good as the existing one (broken line), or at least equal to 2.26 if the best outside supplier can be 
reached, and all errors terms are equal to zero. 
